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wage scale, which is based upon said data, is invalid, and
we should so hold. However, because of the pledge of secrecy
the commission should not be required to divulge the information and therefore its order to the contrary should be made
ineffective by prohibition, as is done by the majority opinion.
Respondents' petition for a rehearing was denied January
15, 1952. Edmonds, J., and Carter, J., were of the opinion
that the petition should be granted.

[Crim. No. 5006.

In Bank.

Dec. 18, 1951.]

THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. CARYL CHESSMAN,
Appellant.
[1] Criminal Law-Rights of Accused-Aid of Counsel-Waiver.
-An accused who of his own volition and with full knowledge
of what he was doing waived assistance of counsel may not
properly assert that denial of a continuance deprived him of
a right to select counsel of his choice and deprived such counsel of an opportunity to prepare, especially where the accused
had the advisory services of a public defender throughout the
trial.
[2] !d.-Rights of Accused-Aid of Counsel-Waiver.-A defendant who intelligently refuses counsel and insists upon personally conducting and controlling his defense does not lose the
status of prisoner and become entitled to extraordinary privileges not accorded defendants who are represented by counsel, nor does he become entitled to proceed in a manner different from that permitted attorneys.
[1] See 7 Cal.Jur. 939; 14 Am.Jur. 882.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2] Crimimil Law, § 110; [3] Criminal
Law, § 1067; [4] Criminal Law, § 96; [5] Criminal Law, § 264;
[6] Criminal Law, § 1353; [7] Criminal Law, § 1092; [8] Criminal Law, § 464; [9, 10] Criminal Law, § 816; [11, 12] Criminal
Law,§ 1434; [13] Criminal Law,§ 1418; [14] Criminal Law,§ 752;
[15] Sodomy, § 11; [16] Sodomy, § 12; [17] Criminal Law, § 809;
[18] Criminal Law, §1426; [19,31] Kidnaping, §2; [20] Kidnaping, § 9; [21] Robbery, § 4; [22] Robbery, § 38; [23] Criminal
Law,§ 358; [24] Robbery,§ 27; [25] Robbery,§ 33(1); [26] Robbery,§ 48; [27] Criminal Law,§ 912(2); [28] Criminal Law,§ 614;
[29] Criminal Law,§ 624; [30] Criminal Law,§ 348; [32] Kidnaping,§ 1; [33] Criminal Law,§ 119; [34] Criminal Law,§ 144; [35]
Criminal Law, § 1447.
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[3] !d.-Appeal-Objections-Consolidation of Charges.-An objection to consolidating for trial crimes charged in separate
informations may not be raised for the first time on appeal.
[4] !d.-Venue-Change of Venue-Hearing and Determination.A denial of a motion for change of venue, sought on grounds
stated orally only, is not subject to attack as having been rendered without giving defendant opportunity to present a written application as required by Pen. Code, § 1034, where a denial on the merits is properly in the court's discretion, the
denial appears not to have been based on the motion's form,
defendant had ample time to prepare a proper application, and
where the motion, made just before the jury were impaneled,
came too late.
[5] !d.-Trial-Requirement That Defendant Remain at Counsel
Table.-Neither the presumption of innocence nor the elements
of a fair trial require a court to conduct the trial of an accused,
acting as his own counsel, without regard to the facts that he is
charged with violent crimes and had been previously convicted
of violent crimes, and the court may properly require him to
remain at the counsel table in consideration of the safety of
all persons in the courtroom.
[6] !d.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Denial of Defendant's Motion
for Daily Transcript.-An accused who conducted his g>wn
defense fails to establish a miscarriage of justice resulting from the court's denial of his motion for a daily transcript, notwithstanding the prosecutor received, apparently
without court order, a transcription of certain parts of the
trial which he used in his argument to the jury, where the
accused was not prejudicially handicapped by want of a daily
transcript and presented his case and delivered his argument
without any indication of confusion or uncertainty. ( Const.,
art. VI, § 4%.)
[7] !d.-Appeal-Objections-Conduct of CounseL-Improprieties
in a prosecutor's conduct and the court's failure, of its own
motion, to object thereto, do not constitute grounds for reversal, where, notwithstanding the conduct could have been corrected by objection at the trial, defendant, who chose to defend
himself and required a skilled attorney sitting by his side to
remain silent, failed to object in line with his technique of
omitting objections.
[8] Id.-Evidence-Confessions.-Admission into evidence of certain confessions is not established as error or as depriving defendant of due process on the ground that they were coerced,
where his arguments as to asserted involuntariness merely relate to conflicting inferences of fact drawn against him by the
court and jury, and hence do not show the confessions to have
been given in circumstances inherently coercive.
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[9] Id.-Instructions---Confessions.-It is not reversible error to
instruct that notwithstanding the jury drtrrmines a confession
to be false, it remains evidence to be considered under instructions to be given subsequently concerning false statements
made by an accused, where a subsequent instruetion co1Teetly
explains the evidentiary value of false statements, ample evidence of guilt apart from the confessions appears, defendant's
declarations may have been true in part, and statements assertedly made by him were to some extent self-contradictory.

[10] Id.-Instructions-Confessions.-Instructions are not sub,iect
to attack as erroneously assuming that defc>udant conf(•ssed,
where the jury were in effect told to determine whether a confession was made, and whether, if made, it was voluntary.
[11] !d.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Instructions-Confessions.-Defendant is not prejudiced by failure to instruct the jury specifically that they should consider his mental condition when
he made purported confessions, where the subject wa~ adPquately covered by instructions, including one requiring the
jury to consider all the circumstances connected with the
making of the confessions in determining whether they were
true.
[12] !d.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Instructions--Confessions.Failure to instruct specifically that any doubt as to the voluntariness of a confession was to he resolved in favor of defendant does not prejudice him, where given instructions correetly
explain the burden of proof and the doetrine of reasonable
doubt, and where it cannot reasonably be concluded that a
different verdict would have resulted had the omitted instruction been given.
[13] !d.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Instructions-Effect of Considering as a Whole.-Notwithstanding certain parts of instructions in a criminal case standing alone may seem to assume
that a certain count was established as a matter of law, the
instructions are not subject to attack on such ground, where
the jury are instructed to consider them as a whole, and where,
so considered, it does not appear that the jury could han~
been misled into believing that the court considered the eount
to be so established.
[14] Id.-Instructions-Specific Intent.-It is not rPasonahly probable that the jury was caused to misunderstand an adequate
instruction on specific intent by the giving of general instruP.tions that a criminal intent is established by showing an intent
to do an aet which, if committed, will constitute a crime, and
that the intent with which an act is done is manifested hy the
circumstances attending it, the manner in which it is done,
the means used and the sound mind and discretion of the actor.
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ri5] Sodomy- Evidence--Accomplice Testimony--Corroboration.
-There is no requirement of corroboration of testimony of
female witnesses who, when they acted in violation of Pen.
Code, § 288a, relating to sex perversions, did so m fear of
their lives and hence were not accomplices.
(16) Id.-Instructions.-An instruction that there is no requirement of corroboration of the testimony of witnesses who violated Pen. Code, § 288a, not as accomplices but in fear of their
lives, is not equivalent to a direction to the jury to convict
the defendant of crimes charged, including those requiring a
specific intent, if the jury believed that defendant committed
the overt acts to which the prosecuting· witnesses testified,
thereby permitting conviction without proof of specific intent.
[17] Criminal Law--Instructions-Evidence-Flight.-An instruction as to evidence of flight required by Pen. Code, § 1127c,
where such evidence is relied on as showing guilt, need not be
in the precise words of the section.
[18] !d.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Instructions.-An instruction
telling the jury to disregard instructions applying to facts
found not to exist is not prejudicially erroneous as permitting
the jury to disregard any other instruction if they concluded
that such instructions did not apply to the facts whether the
facts were legally proved or were merely the jurors' opinion.
[19] Kidnaping-Infliction of Bodily Harm.-Both forcible rape
and compelling a violation of Pen. Code, § 288a, constitute the
infliction of bodily harm within § 209, relating to punishment
for kidnaping.
[20] !d.-Review-Questions of Law and Fact.-It is for the trier
of fact rather than an appellate tribunal to determine whether
a male defendant who engaged in a course of conduct toward
a female which included robbery and attempted robbery, asportation of the victim and commission of sex crimes, ceased
to be a robber at some time during the abduction and became
a kidnaper whose sole purpose was to inflict bodily harm by
forcibly committing sex crimes.
(21] Robbery-Intent.-The words "This is a stick-up" normally
imply an intent to rob.
[22] !d.-Questions of Law and Fact.-It is for the trier of fact
to determine whether the words "This is a stick-up," when
considered in their context, show an intent to commit sex
crimes rather than to rob.
[23] Criminal Law- Evidence- Inferences.- An inference may
properly be based on another inference which is not too remote
or conjectural.
[15] See 23 Cal.Jur. 400; 48 Am.Jur. 552.
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[24] Robbery-Evidence.-A robbery conviction is sustained by
evidence that defendant, displaying a .45 automatic, ordered
a victim to surrender money, and that the victim against his
will did so.
[25] !d.-Evidence-Identity of Accused.-A robbery conviction
is sustained notwithstanding defendant is not positively identified, where he confesses to the crime, and where the crime
was committed in a manner strikingly similar to that of other
crimes in the commission of which he was positively identified.
[26] Id.- Attempted Robbery- Evidence. -A conviction of attempted robbery is sustained by evidence that defendant approached an occupied parked automobile, pushed a .45 automatic through the door and said "This is a stick-up."
[27] Criminal Law-Instructions-Lesser Offenses-Necessity for
Request.-A defendant convicted of grand theft of an automobile may not, for the first time on appeal, assert that the court
should have instructed on the lesser offense, described in Veh.
Code, § 503, of taking an automobile without the owner's consent, particularly where it does not appear that defendant returned or intended to return the automobile to its owner.
[28a, 28b] Id.- Argument of Counsel- Number of Counsel.-Although Pen. Code, § 1095, permits two counsel on each side to
argue in a prosecution for commission of a crime punishable
by death, the court did not err to defendant's prejudice in
refusing to permit both defendant and an attorney to argue
defendant's cause to the jury, where, notwithstanding defendant has the aid of such attorney at the trial, such attorney acts as "legal adviser" only and not as counsel, and
where defendant failed to object at the trial to the ruling.
[29] !d.-Argument of Counsel-Arguing Law.-It is for the court
to decide questions of law and although it may permit counsel
in argument to state correct law, and to discuss the application
of the law to the facts, it may also refuse him permission to
argue law.
[30] !d.-Jury-Instructions After Submission of Case.-It is not
error for the court to discuss with the jury the meaning of
"life imprisonment without possibility of parole," and to permit the prosecutor to argue that the phrase overlooks the
possibility of pardon, commutation and legislative change in
the penalty, where the court's remarks were in answer to a
juror's question, which, although propounded after the prosecutor's argument, apparently arose after the jury had determined that a charged kidnaping carne within Pen. Code, § 209,
and while they were in the process of fixing the penalty.
[3la, 3lb] Kidnaping- Effect of Amendment of Statute.- The
1951 amendment of Pen. Code, § 209, making a detention of
[29] See 8 Cal.Jur. 270; 53 Am.Jur. 399.
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the victim during an armed robbery no longer punishable under
the section, does not require reversal or modification of death
sentences, where the offenses for which the penalties were imposed were not mere armed robberies but kidnapings with intent to inflict bodily harm which remain punishable by death.
[32] Id.-Elements.-It is the fact, not the distance, of forcible
removal which constitutes kidnaping.
[33] Criminal Law-Former Jeopardy.-The doctrine of double
jeopardy has no application to a defendant who is tried bu,t
once on several counts.
[34] !d.-Former Jeopardy-Identity of Offenses.-Punishing a
defendant separately for violations of Pen. Code, § 209, relating to kidnaping, and for robberies and sex crimes which are
essential parts of the violations would amount to double punishment forbidden by Pen. Code, § 654.
[35] Id.-Appeal-Reversal.-Where a defendant is subject to two
validly imposed death sentences, invalid judgments of conviction rendered in the same prosecution will not be reversed.

APPEAL (automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239)
from judgments of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County
and from an order denying a new trial. Charles W. Fricke,
Judge. Affirmed.
Prosecution for first degree robbery, grand theft, kidnaping
for purpose of robbery, and other offenses. Judgments of conviction, affirmed.
Caryl Chessman, in pro. per., for Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Frank Richards,
Deputy Attorney General, S. Ernest Roll, District Attorney
(Los Angeles), Jere J. Sullivan, Robert Wheeler and J. Miller
Leavy, Deputy District Attorneys, for Respondent.
SCHAUER, J.-Defendant appeals from judgments of
conviction of 17 felonies, rendered pursuant to jury verdicts,
and from an order denying his motion for new trial. For
convenience of discussion the crimes are listed in chronological order and numbered. Each paragraph indicates a
separate general criminal enterprise, in each of which one or
more offenses were committed.
January 3, 1948: (1) ]'irst degree robbery of McCullough.
January 13, 1948: (2) Grand theft of an automobile,
which was used in perpetrating subsequent crimes and in
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which defendant was fleeing· vvhen he was apprehended.
January 18, 1948: (3) First degree robbery of Bartle.
January 18, 1948: ( 4) :F'irst degree robbery of Ballew.
January 19, 1948: (5) First degree robbery of Lea.
( 6) First degree robbery of Regina. ( 7) Kidnaping Regina for the purpose of robbery, with infliction of bodily
harm; punishment fixed at death. ( 8) Violation of section
288a of the Penal Code, committed against Regina.
January 20, 1948: (9) First degree robbery of Stone.
January 22, 1948: (10) Attempted robbery of Hurlburt.
(11) Kidnaping Mary for the purpose of robbery, with infliction of bodily harm; punishment :fixed at death. (12) Attempted rape of Mary. (13) Violation of section 288a of the
Penal Code committed against Mary.
January 23, 1948: (14) First degree robbery of Waisier.
(15) First degree robbery of I;esher. (16) Kidnaping
vVaisler for the purpose of robbery, with infliction of bodily
harm; punishment fixed at life imprisonment witl1out possibility of parole. ( 17) Kidnaping I1esher for the purpose
of robbery.
'l'he jury further found that defendant was armed at the
time of the commission of each of the crimes except that of
grand theft, numbered (2) above; that he was armed at the
time of his arrest; and that he had suffered two previous convictions of robbery and one of assault with a deadly weapon.
Defendant was acquitted of one count of burglary. We have
concluded that no prejudicial error is shown and that the
judgments and order should be affirmed.
Sufficiency of Transcript
Defendant argues questions as to the correctness and validity of the reporter's transcript which were finally decided
against him by this court in People v. Chessman (1950), 35
Cal.2d 455 [218 P.2d 769, 19 A.L.R.2d 1084]. Reexamination
of these arguments and of the transcript leaves us convinced
that the transcript permits a fair consideration and disposition of the appeal.
Denial of Continuance to Enable Defendant to Obta·in Counsel., or to Interview and Subpena Witnesses ancl Prepare
IIis Case in P1·opria Persona
Defendant eomplains that he was fUl·eed to go to trial unprepared. The situation on whieh this claim is based resulted
from the fact that he insisted upon representing himself.
The informations against defendant (numbered 117963 and

Dec. 1951]

PEOPLE v. CHESSMAN

173

[38 C.2d 166; 238 P.2d 1001]

117964) were filed on February 18, 1948. On February 20,
1948, defendant, represented by private counsel Morris Lavine, was arraigned and the causes were continued to :B'ebruary 27. On February 27 amended informations were filed
and the causes continued to March 5. On March 5, defendant,
l"epresented by private counsel V. L. Ferguson, appeared and
was arraigned on amended informations; time to plead was
continued to March 9. On March 9 defendant and Mr. Ferguson appeared and Mr. Ferguson was relieved as counsel.
Defendant now asserts: ''one of those counsel wanted mor(l
money than appellant believed his services were worth and
appellant and his father could not agree with the other counsel as to the conduct of the defense, so both were relieved and
appellant determined to represent himself."
On March 12, 1948, defendant appeared without counsel.
'!'he public defender was present and announced, ''We have
been relieved, your Honor." Defendant stated that he wished
to represent himself. .After a colloquy with the court during
which defendant repeated his insistence on representing
himself, the court said, "-What will probably happen, if we
set this case down for trial, you will want a lawyer and then
ask for a continuance. If you want to try your own case,
there is no way we can tell you not to. You will have to try
it or have somebody hired to represent you in plenty of time
to try the case at the time it is set. THE DEFENDANT CHESSMAN: I understand that. THE CoUR'l' :. Because many times
men with past experiences such as you have had-you know
the tricks of the trade, and they get a lawyer at the very last
minute. You really want to try your own case~ THE DEF"ENDANT CHESSMAN : That is correct.'' Defendant pleaded
not guilty; the court set April 26 and 29 as the dates for
trial on the respective informations and again explained to
defendant that no continuance based on his decision to represent himself would be gTanted. "Some time during the middle of March'' Mr . .Al Matthews, deputy public defender,
called on defendant at the county jail and offered his services;
defendant rcfu,_<:ed them. On .April 26 all charges against
defendant were continued to .April 29 for trial. On April 29
defendant appeared without counsel, moved for another continuance, and complained that because of his confinement
in the county jail he had been unable to obtain lawbooks
and interview witnesses. The trial court explained to him
that his decision to represent himself did not entitle him to
greater privileges than other prisoners; defendant again re-
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peatedly refused the offer of counsel; and a continuance was
denied.
Defendant summarizes the trial court's position as follows :
''That the calendar judge in assigning the case for trial had
warned the defendant that he must be ready and that he
would be allowed no continuance. That the trial court offered
to appoint counsel who could have prepared a defense for the
defendant. That because the defendant refused the appointment of counsel it was the defendant's own fault that he was
not prepared, that he could not consequently complain of his
lack of preparation, that the sheriff's regulations [of the
privileges accorded prisoners in the county jail] could not
be interfered with by the court, and that, therefore, the defendant must go to trial, prepared or not.'' This is a fair
summary of the court's position; that position appears correct; and defendant cites no authority to the contrary.
[l] Defendant argues that the denial of a continuance
deprived him of the right to select counsel of his choice and
deprived such counsel of the opportunity to prepare. The
answer to this contention is factual and appears from the
above summarized history of the proceedings prior to trial.
Defendant was entitled to waive assistance of counsel, and it
is clear that he did so of his own volition and with full knowledge of what he was doing (Adams v. United States ex rel.
McCann (1942), 317 U.S. 269, 279 [63 S.Ct. 236, 87 L.Ed.
268, 143 .A.L.R. 435] ; cf. People v. Chesser ( 1947), 29 Cal.2d
815, 822 [178 P.2d 761] ).
[2] Furthermore, defendant did not go to trial without
the services of an attorney at law. Immediately before the
jury were impaneled, defendant announced to the court
that he intended to accept the services of Mr. Matthews as
legal adviser (not counsel) and throughout the trial Mr.
Matthews was present and his legal ability and experience
were available to defendant. These circumstances will be
material to our disposition of certain contentions of defendant hereinafter discussed, and it will be necessary for us to
refer again to the following proposition: .A defendant who
intelligently refuses counsel and insists upon personally
conducting and controlling his defense does not lose the
status of prisoner and become entitled to extraordinary
privileges not accorded defendants who are represented by
counsel, nor does he become entitled to proceed in a manner
different from that permitted to attorneys.
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Consolidation of Cmmts
[3] Defendant contends that the trial court erred to his
prejudice by consolidating for trial the crimes charged in Information 117963 with the crimes charged in Information
117964. This type of objection cannot be urged for the first
time on appeal. (People v. Pearson (1940), 41 Cal.App.2d
614, 619 [107 P.2d 463]; People v. Johns (1945), 69 Cal.App.
2d737, 740 [160 P.2d102]; People v. Beck (1945), 71 Cal.App.
2d 637, 641 [163 P.2d 41].)
Defendant asserts that he objected to the consolidation in
the trial court but the record 1 shows that he did not. Originally the case of Information 117963, by which defendant and
David Knowles were jointly charged with crimes described
in People v. Knowles (1950), 35 Cal.2d 175 [217 P.2d 1]
(grand theft of an automobile, above numbered (2), and two
robberies and two kidnapings, above numbered (14) through
(17) ) , was set for trial on April 26, 1948; the case of Information 117964, which charged defendant alone with the
remaining crimes of which he has been convicted, was set for
trial on April 29. When the first group of charges came on
for trial defendant's motions for a trial separate from that
of Knowles and a continuance were granted. All charges
against defendant came on for trial on April 29. At this
time the court ordered the cases against defendant consolidated for trial. Defendant asked "that these cases be returned to the Master Calendar court for reassignment'' and
stated at length his reasons for this request, but he did not
suggest that the cases should not have been consolidated.
Motion for Change of Venue
Immediately before the jury were impaneled, Mr. Matthews
stated to the court that defendant wished to move for change
of venue, on grounds unknown to Matthews, and that he
could have the application prepared later in the day. The
trial court told defendant to state orally the grounds on which
he sought change of venue. Defendant stated that he could
not obtain a fair trial in the county because a prejudicial
article about him had appeared in a local publication, and
because the district attorney planned to prosecute another
person for crimes which were similar to some of those charged
'The pertinent portion of the transcript was prepared by the original
reporter and defendant does not challenge its accuracy.
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against defendant and which had been committed at times
when defendant was in prison. The court ruled, "The motion
will be denied. ''
[4] Defendant complains that he was not given opportunity to present a written, verified application as required
by section 1034 of the Penal Code. There is no indication
that the denial of the motion was on the ground that it was
not in proper form. Defendant had had ample time to prepare a proper application, and the motion came too late and
should have been denied even if it had been in writing.
Furthermore, the trial court was well within its discretion
in denying the motion on the merits.
Req~~irernent

That Defendant Remain at Co1lnsel Table
[5] During voir dire examination of the prospective
jurors defendant was not allowed to approach the jury box
and during the trial he was not allowed to approach witnesses
on the stand. Defendant urges that he was hampered in the
presentation of his ease and unfairly discriminated against,
since the prosecuting attorney moved about the courtroom
~nd dramatically approached witnesses and jury, whereas
defendant, in violation of section 688 of the Penal Code,
was subjected to "more restraint than . . . [was] necessary
for his detention to answer the charge.'' The trial court's
ruling was within its discretion. Defendant, whether or
not he was guilty of the crimes charged in this proceeding,
was a defendant on trial for these charges. In representing
himself he retained this status and did not attain that of an
attorney at law who is an officer of the court and responsible
to it. Furthermore, the defendant had suffered previous
convictions of crimes of violence. Neither the presumption
of innocence as a rule of proof in relation to the crimes
charged nor the elements of a fair trial under due process
required the court to conduct the trial proceedings oblivious
to the facts mentioned. Considerations for the safety and
security of all persons present in the courtroom, including
the defendant, and for the judicial process itself, justified the
trial judge in feeling that it was unwise to allow defendant
to wander freely about the courtroom.
Den'ial of Defendant's Motion fat' Daily Transcript

[6] Although the trial judge knew that the trial would be
long, the factual issues numerous, and the death penalty
would be sought, he denied defendant's motion for a daily
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transcript.
The prosecuting attorney did not request or
receive a daily transcript but he did obtain, apparently without court order, transcription of certain portions of the trial
which he used in his argument to the jury. The reason for
this seeming discrimination does not appear. But' neither
does it appear that defendant was prejudicialJy handicapped
by want of a daily transcript. He presented his case and delivered his argument without any indication of confusion
or uncertainty; accordingly, no miscarriage of justice on this
account is established. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 4Jf2.)

111isconduct of Prosecuting Attorney Not Controlled
by the Trial Court
[7] Regrettably, the prosecuting attorney presented his
case in an overzealous manner, both in addressing the jury2
and in improperly bringing in evidence of misconduct of defendant for which he was not on triaP But the improprieties
of the prosecuting attorney could have been corrected had
there been objection thereto in the trial court. Defendant
now complains that the trial court of its own motion should
have interposed objections and, in effect, undertaken defend2
The prosecuting attorney on voir dire examination of the prospective
jurors said, ''I do not believe the evidence will show that the defendant
has murdered or killed anyone yet.'' On the voir dire examination
and in argument he emphasized his belief that defendant should receive
the death penalty. He commented that defendant was representing
himself in order to gain the sympathy of the jury.
The prosecuting attorney in argument was summarizing evidence of
one of the robberies when a juror asked, "Isn't that grand theft when
it is over $500?" He replied, "It is true, Mrs. Vamos, that I could
from the penal code give you at least a half dozen particular crimes that
I know he has committed that he is not charged with here . . . . You
are correct. It is grand theft, because the amount taken was over
$500. But robbery is a different character of crime than grand theft,
although we could charge him, we just didn't do it . . . . It is a violation of the deadly weapons act for . . . a man who has been previously
convicted of a felony, to . . . have in their possession this gun. He is
not charged with it. It is just one of the other things. I can think of
some other crimes which he has committed such as assault with a deadly
weapon. We did not charge it. I would have to stop some place or
we would be talking here all day. I do not want to do that. Don't let
those things bother you too much.''
"Officer Forbes, who gave proper evidence of admissions and confessions made by defendant, was also permitted, without objection,
to testify to statements of defendant which disclosed what defendant
now aptly characterizes as his ''self-admitted violent criminal past and
present dangerous, antisocial state of mind.'' These later statements
were introduced by the prosecution under the guise of impeaching defendant's testimony as to the context of his conversations with Forbes.
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ant's representation. But defendant deliberately (and not
naively) determined to represent himself; part of the technique of his representation appears to have been the studied
omission to interpose objections, the frank admission that
he was a criminal, and the argument that the crimes charged
were committed by a blundering person rather than a clever
professional such as the eyidence indicates he was; he followed this technique while requiring a skilled defense attorney to sit silently at his side. We are not disposed to
permit a defendant who thus develops a record to claim
prejudice from it, although the cumulative instances of misconduct might in other circumstances constitute ground for
reversal. It is because of defendant's purposeful and informed failure to have this case tried in a different fashion
that such cases as People v. Orcalles (1948), 32 Cal.2d 562,
572 [ 197 P .2d 26] ; People v. Hardy ( 1948), 33 Cal.2d 52,
62 [198 P.2d 865] ; and People v. Lynch (1943), 60 Cal.App.
2d 133, 143 [140 P.2d 418], are not controlling here.
Admissibility of Confessions
Defendant urges that the admission in evidence of assertedly coerced confessions was not merely error but deprived
him of due process. The evidence as to the circumstances
under which the confessions were obtained was in conflict as
to whether defendant was beaten by the police but, defendant
urges, there is sufficient uncontradicted evidence to overcome,
as a matter of law, the People's prima facie showing that
the confessions were voluntary. The evidence in this respect
is as follows :
On Friday evening, January 23, 1948, police officers in a
patrol car observed an automobile which corresponded to the
description of the one which had been used in certain of the
crimes here charged. When the officers turned on their red
spotlight the car, which was driven by defendant, fled. There
was a lengthy chase, first in the automobiles, then on foot.
Defendant was captured and handcuffed after a struggle.
He was taken to the Hollywood police station and held there
until Monday evening, January 26, 1948, when he was taken
to the Los Angeles county jail.
On the night of January 23 defendant was questioned by
police officers from about 8 :30 to 10 :30. On the morning
of January 24 Officer Forbes commenced to question defendant at about 8 o'clock. Defendant first denied participation in any of the crimes here concerned. Forbes told defend-
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ant, "you can't beat us on this particular job" (the crimes
committed with Knowles), and pointed out that defendant
had been driving a stolen car which contained loot from
those crimes; defendant then confessed those crimes. Forbes
and other officers continued the interrogation, particularly
concerning the sex crimes. The officers testified that they
made no promise of reward or inducement. Defendant asserts that he confessed to the sex crimes only after the officers
said they would charge him solely with robbery.
On January 24 defendant was taken to the home of a victim of some of the crimes. She identified him. Defendant
testified that during this trip the officers' conduct made it
clear to him that they hoped he would attempt to escape.
That this conduct was for the purpose of putting defendant in
fear, he argues, is shown by the testimQny of one of the
officers who accompanied defendant that he had another officer
"tail us in case anything happened in our car."
The asserted confessions of the sex crimes were made on the
afternoon of January 24, after defendant had talked to a
police psychiatrist with whom he refused to discuss such
crimes .. Defendant argues that it is inherently improbable
that he would refuse to discuss the matter with the psychiatrist and would shortly thereafter voluntarily confess the
crimes to the police.
Officer Forbes, one of the officers who questioned defendant,
testified that a bulletin to the eifect that defendant had confessed to the sex crimes was sent on the police teletype at 9 :15
a. m. on January 24, although defendant did not confess
until after 3 o'clock of that afternoon. This premature release of the bulletin (assuming Officer Forbes' statement of
the time of release to be correct), says defendant, shows that
the officer anticipated that, although a voluntary confession
was not forthcoming, a confession would in some manner be
obtained.
Officer Forbes testified that it was usual police practice to
have a defendant who admitted his guilt sign a written confession but that he did not request defendant to do so because
"I thought it would be useless" and that he made no written
notes while talking with defendant because ''Some suspects
will relate it and let you write it down as you take it; other
suspects wouldn't tell you anything if they know you are
taking notes.'' Yet another police officer who, with Forbes,
questioned defendant testified that he made a list of crimes
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(not the crimes cbarge0 here) to which defendant confessed
and that he wrote the list in defendant's and Forbes' presence after defendant said, "Get your pencil and paper."
This contrasting testimony, says defendant, shows that his
confessions to the crimes charged were not free.
Further showing that his mentality was not free when he
confessed, says defendant, is Forbes' testimony that '' [W] hen
we were thumbing through the crime sheets, anything that
we thought might fit the description of Chessman, he would
say, ' . . . If you want to clear your books just mark them
off. I'll take credit for them.' ''
[8] The above recited arguments of defendant as to the
asserted involuntariness of his confessions relate to conflicting
inferences of fact which could be drawn from the testimony.
Those inferences were tentatively drawn against defendant
by the trial judge when he admitted the confessions in evidence and, presumptively, were finally drawn against defendant by the jury in the light of all the evidence. This is not a
case where the confessions are shown, on the face of the record, to have been given in circumstances inherently coercive.
Instructions as to False Confession
[9] The jury were instructed that ''If under my instructions you find that a voluntary confession was made, you are
the exclusive judges as to whether or not the confession was
true; and in deciding that question you should consider all
the circumstances connected with the making of the statement,
as shown by the evidence. But even if you should find that a
confession was false, e·ither entirely or in part, it remains,
nevertheless evidence for your consider·ation, to be given
such significance as your judgment may determine 1tnder instructions that I shortly shall give concerning false statements
made by a person accused of crime." (Italics added.) 'l'he
italicized portion of this instruction was held ground for reversal in People v. Ford (1948), 89 Cal.App.2d 467, 473 [200
P .2d 867], on the ground that "If the jury had believed that
defendant lied to the officers when he admitted the theft,
he should have been acquitted. How they could have started
with the premise that he was innocent and ended with a conclusion that he was guilty because he had lied to the officers is
something we are unable to comprehend. But if this could
not have been done the instruction was confusing and impossible of rational application to the evidence." In the
Ford case, however, "there was only slight circumstantial
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evidence of defendant's guilt aside from the confession''
(p. 471 of 89 Cal.App. 2d) and the trial court gave no explanatory instructions concerning false statements by one
accused of crime. Here there is ample evidence of guilt apart
from the confessions; the declarations of the defendant in
making the confessions may have been in part true and in
part false ; the statements assertedly ma.de by defendant, as
related above, were to some extent self-contradictory; and
the following instruction correctly explaining the possible
evidentiary value or immateriality. of false statements was
given : ''If you should :find from the evidence that there was
an occasion when the defendant, under conditions which
fairly afforded him an opportunity to reply, . . . made false,
evasive or contradictory statements, in the face of an accusation, expressed directly to him or in his presence, charging
him with the crime for which he now is on trial or tending
to connect him with its commission, and if you should :find
that he heard the accusation and understood its nature, . . .
his . . . conduct may be considered against him as indicating an admission that the accusation thus made was true.
Evidence of such an accusatory statement is not received for
the purpose of proving its truth, but only to explain the conduct of the accused in the face of it; and unless you should
find that his conduct at the time indicated an admission that
the accusatory statement was true, you should entirely disregard the statement." (See, also, People v. Woods (1950),
35 Cal.2d 504, 510 [218 P.2d 981], and People v. Liss (1950),
3fi Cal.2d 570, 574 [219 P.2d 789], pointing out the dangers
of an instruction such as the italicized portion of the instruction quoted on p. 180, supra, but holding such instruction not reversible error in the circumstances.)

Contention that the Instructions Took From the Jury the
Ques#on Whether a Confession Was in Ifact Made
[10] Defendant contends that the instructions assume
that defendant in fact confessed. The instruction quoted
supra, p. 180, commences, ''If under my instructions you
find that a voluntary confession was made . . . , '' and the
jury elsewhere were told that they "must disregard the asserted confession entirely unless you . . . conclude that the
alleged confession not only was made, but was voluntary.''
Thus it was made clear to the jury that the question whether
a confession was made, as well as its character as voluntary
or involuntary, if made at all, was :for them to determine.
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Omission to Instruct that Jury Sho~tld Consider Defendant's
Mental Condition at the Time He Made Any Confession
[11] Defendant contends that the trial court should have
instructed the jury that, in determining the weight and effect
of any confessions, they should consider the question of defendant's mental condition at the time of such confessions.
In the light of the entire record the subject was adequately
covered by the instructions, which include the specific direction that the jury, in deciding whether the confessions
were true, ''should consider all the circumstances connected
with the making of the statement, as shown by the evidence.''
Omission to Instruct that if the Jury Had a Reasonable
Doubt as to Whether· any Confession Was Voluntary,
They Should Resolve Such Doubt In Favor of Defendant
[12] The trial court rejected defendant's requested instruction to the above effect. The refusal of the instruction,
says defendant, improperly placed on him the burden of
proving that the confessions were involuntary and was contrary to the general statement, quoted in People v. Ralph
(1944), 24 Cal.2d 575, 581 [150 P.2d 401], that "the defendant is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable doubt,
whether it arise out of a question of fact, or as to the true
interpretation of words or the construction of language used
in a statute.'' The requested instruction correctly state:;
the law and might well have been given but, on the other
hand, the jury were fully and correctly instructed as to the
burden of proof and the doctrine of ''reasonable doubt'' as
governing all issues of fact, and it cannot be reasonably concluded that the failure to give this particular instruction,
spe~ifically applying the general principles which were explained, resulted in a verdict different from that which would
have been reached if the instruction had been given.
Contention that the Instructions Assume that Defendant
Committed Kidnaping for the Purpose of Robbery
[13] As to the counts which charge kidnaping for the
purpose of robbery the court instructed the jury that "it will
be your duty to determine whether the person or persons
subjected to such kidnaping suffered bodily harm.'' These
instructions, defendant urges, improperly assume and inform
the jury that kidnaping for the purpose of robbery was established as a matter of law. If we were to consider the
isolated portions of the instructions just quoted, they would
be subject to this criticism. But, considering the instructions
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as a whole-and the jury were told to so consider themit does not appear that they could lead the jury to believe
that the court was of the opinion, or intimated an opinion,
that the crimes of kidnaping for the purpose of robbery had
been established.
Claimed Inadequacy of Instructions as to Specific Intent
[14] Defendant urges that the trial court, of its own motion,
should have given more detailed instructions as to the specific
intent to commit robbery which is an essential element of the
crime of kidnaping for the purpose of robbery. The following adequate instructions were given: ''In the case of certain crimes it is necessary that in addition to the intended
act which characterizes the offense, the act must be accompanied by a specific or particular intent without which such
a crime may not be committed . . .
"[I]n the crime of Kidnapping for the Purpose of Robbery,
a necessary element is the existence in the mind of the perpetrator of the specific intent to commit robbery and unless
such intent so exists that crime is not committed, but
"No actual robbery need be committed, as the Kidnapping
is complete once the individual is seized for the purpose of
robbery."
Defendant, relying upon People v. Snyder (1940), 15 Cal.
2d 706, 708 [104 P.2d 639], urges that the instructions were
insufficient because the jury were also instructed generally
that ''To constitute criminal intent it is merely necessary
that a person intend to do an act which, if committed, will
constitute a crime,'' and that ''The intent with which an
act is done is manifested by the circumstances attending
the act, the manner in which it is done, the means used, and
the sound mind and discretion of the person committing the
act.'' It is not reasonably probable that the latter instructions caused the jury to misunderstand the instruction as to
the specific intent to rob. The Snyder case, which concerned
materially different instructions and a materially different
crime, does not apply here.
[15, 16] The trial judge instructed the jury that in prosecution for the various crimes here charged corroboration of
the prosecuting witnesses was not required. This instruction
was correct. The undisputed evidence shows that the female victims were not accomplices, but were act~ng in fear
of their lives, in the violations of section 288a ; therefore,
corroboration of their testimony was not required. (People v.
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Featherstone (1945), 67 Cal.App.2d 793,796 [155 P.2d 685].)
But, defendant argues, the instruction that corroboration was
not required was equivalent to a direction to convict of the
crimes charged, including those requiring specific intent, if
the jury believed that defendant committed the overt acts to
which the prosecuting witnesses testified; therefore, he says,
the instruction permitted conviction without proof of specific
intent. On no rational view of the instruction, either in or
out of its context, could it have the meaning attributed to it
by defendant.
Instruction as to Flight
[17] Section 1127c of the Penal Code provides that,
where evidence of flight is relied upon, the court shall instruct the jury substantially in language there set. out. The
trial court did so. Defendant argues that slight variations
between the language of the statutory instruction and the
language of the instruction here given are significant. This
argument is elaborate but insubstantial.
Instnwtion that Jury Disregard Instructions which Apply
to Facts which They Find Do not Exist
[18] The court told the jury that ''The applicability of
some of these instructions will depend upon the conclusions
you reach as to what the facts are. As to any such instruction, the fact that it has been g·iven must not be taken as indicating an opinion of the court that the instruction will be
necessary or as to what the facts are. If an instruction applies only to a state of facts which you find does not exist,
you will disregard the instruction. ''
Defendant relies upon People v Bodey (1928), 94 Cal.App.
420, 423 [271 P. 203], where it is said that a similar instruction should not have been given; that it was confusing but
not reversible error. It is defendant's position that under
this instruction the jury could disregard any of the other instructions if they concluded that such instructions did not
apply to the facts, whether such facts were legally proven
or were the mere opinion of the jurors.
It does not appear that the instruction complained of is
susceptible to an interpretation which would make it prejudicially erroneous. In People v. Casey (1926), 79 Cal.App.
295, 302 [249 P. 525], it was said of a similar instruction that
"Although more apt language might well have been used,
it appears that the meaning intended to be conveyed was
merely this : That while certain rules of law had been stated,
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the court did not wish to be understood as expressing any
opinion upon matters of fact. It is obvious that whether or
not legal principles announced are applicable to the facts
of a particular case will often depend upon the jury's interpretation of the evidence." (See, also, People v. Palmer
(1946), 76 Cal.App.2d 679,686 [173 P.2d 680].)
Attempted Ra1Je and Forcing Victim to V1:olate Section /288a
of the Penal Code as Infliietion of Bodily Harm
[19] Bodily harm under section 209 of the Penal Code is
defined in People v. Tamner ( 1935), 3 Cal.2d 279, 297 [44
P.2d 324]: "Bo&ily hm·m is g·enerally defined as 'any touching of the person of another against his will with physical
force in an intentional, hostile and aggravated manner, or
projecting of sueh force against his person.' '' The trial eourt
so instructed the jmy; it further instructed them that both
attempted forcible rape and compelling a violation of section 288a are "bodily harm."
Statements in People v. Mcilvain (1942), 55 CaLApp.2d
322, 332 [130 P.2d 131], which tend to support defendant's
argument that the commission of the sex crimes by threat of
force did not amount to the infliction of bodily harm were
disapproved in People v. B1"0Wn (1947), 29 Cal.2d 555, 560
r176 P.2d 929]. In the Brown case we reiterated the definition of bodily harm as quoted above from the Tanner case
and declared that "The forcible rape itself was bodily harm."
We note that the facts of the Brown case differ from those of
defendant's case in that Brown actually struck his victim as
well as raping her, but we hold that the rule of the Brown
case is equally applicable here. It would belie sensibility
and defame the mores of our age to hold that such treatment
as the female vietinu:; received here is not the infliction of
''bodily harm'' within the meaning of section 209 of the
Penal Code.
Defendant's Contention that the Evidence Does Not S1tpport
the Detenninatio11 that Crimes (8) and (11), J{,idnap?·ngs, Were for the Purpose of Robbery
[20] On January 19, 1948, defendant stopped a car
driven by him near a parked car occupied by I..~ea and Regina.
He displayed a .45 automatic pistol and during the ensuing
events repeatedly threatened to kill hiR victims if they did
not obey his commands. Defendant took Lea's wallet, the
keys to I..~ea 's car, and Regina's purse. He then forced Re-
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gina to walk 22 feet to the car he was using, to enter the
car, and to violate section 288a. Another automobile approached. Defendant took $5.00 from Regina's purse, handed
her the purse and Lea's keys, permitted her to get out of his
car, and drove swiftly away.
On January 22, 1948, defendant approached a parked car
occupied by Hurlburt and Mary, pushed a .45 automatic
pistol through the door, and said, ''This is a stick-up.'' Both
victims replied that they had no money. Defendant then
forced Mary to enter his car, drove to an isolated place, and
compelled her to submit to sex crimes.
Defendant argues that the above summarized evidence at
the most shows that he first robbed Regina and attempted to
rob Mary, then abandoned his intent to rob and abducted the
women with the sole intention of committing sex crimes
against them. This argument is without merit. A defendant
who engages in a course of conduct toward a female victim
which includes robbery or attempted robbery, asportation of
the victim, and the commission of sex crimes may present
such argument to the trier of fact. But we cannot say as a
matter of law that at some point of time during the abductions
of his female victims defendant ceased to be a robber and became a kidnaper whose sole purpose was to inflict bodily harm
by forcibly committing sex crimes. (See the following cases
in which the described series of related criminal transactions
were held to support a conviction of violation of section 209
of the Penal Code [kidnaping for the purpose of robbery in
which the person kidnaped suffered bodily harm] : People v.
Kristy (1935), 4 Cal.2d 504, 507 [50 P.2d 798] [robbery followed by abduction for the primary purpose of escape, during
which the kidnaped persons suffered bodily harm]; People v. Dugger (1936), 5 Cal.2d 337, 339 [54 P.2d 707] [defendant beat his female victim, dragged her around her house,
attempted to rape her, and ransacked bureau drawers]; People v. Brown (1947), supm, 29 Cal. 2d 555, 558 [defendant
abducted a woman, raped her, then took her watch and automobile; in the language of People v. Knowles (1950), supra,
35 Cal.2d 175, 185, "the taking of the wristwatch made the
abduction kidnapping to commit robbery, even if the original
objective were rape and the intent to rob was only an afterthought"]; cf. People v. Welsh (1936), 7 Cal.2d 209, 212 [60
P.2d 124] [forcible abduction and attempted rape; the defendant took a package of cigarettes from the woman's purse
without taking the money which was in it or disturbing its
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contents; held, this was not kidnaping for the purpose of
robbery].)
[21-23] Defendant urges that the words'' This is a stick-up''
do not show an intent to rob. This is their normal implication.
Defendant's contention that in their context in the crimes
against Hurlburt and Mary they show an intent to commit
sex crimes is one of fact which should not be addressed to this
court. In this connection defendant presents an elaborate
discussion of the question whether it is permissible to base
an inference on an inference. As stated in Vaccarezza v.
Sanguinetti (1945), 71 Cal.App.2d 687, 698 [163 P.2d 470],
''The statement appearing in some cases that an inference
cannot be based upon an inference, usually without citation
and certainly without adequate discussion, does not and cannot mean that an inference cannot be based upon a fact
which is itself based upon circumstantial evidence. . . . The
true rule is and should be that an inference cannot be based
on an inference that is too remote or conjectural.''
Sufficiency of Evidence of Crimes (1), (9), and (10)
[24-26] Defendant's arguments in this connection can be
answered by briefly stating the evidence which he says is insufficient. As to crime ( 1), robbery, the victim testified that
defendant, displaying a .45 automatic, ordered him to surrender money and he, against his will, did so. The victim
of crime (9), robbery, was unable to identify defendant
positively; however, the crime was committed in a manner
strikingly similar to that of other crimes where defendant
was positively identified; furthermore, defendant confessed
to this robbery. That the evidence of crime (10), attempted
robbery, was sufficient appears from our summary thereof in
connection with the kidnaping of Mary.

Omission to Instruct as to Section 503 of the Vehicle Code
(Taking an Automobile Without Owner's Consent)
[27] As to crime (2), grand theft of an automobile, there
is ample evidence (the length of time and manner in which
defendant used the car) to show that he intended to steal it.
But, defendant says, the evidence would also permit the inference that he took the car with intent merely to deprive
the owner of possession temporarily; i.e., the lesser offense
of violation of section 503 of the Vehicle Code; and the jury
should have been so instructed. In support of this contention
defendant refers to the prosecuting attorney's argument that
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''There ar<> fellows like Chessman who are scouting around
looking for a particular kind of ear which they want to
steal for a few days.'' l f defendant wished to raise this
contention, he should have requested an instruction as to the
lesser offense and argued the matter to the jury. Furthermore, it does not appear that defendant returned, or at any
time intended to return, the car to its owner.
Asserted Violation of Sect,ion 109!3 of the Penal Code
[28a] Section 1095 provides, ''If the indictment or information be for an offense punishable with death, two counsel
on each side may argue the cause to the jury.'' After the
prosecuting attorney eoncluded l1is opening argument the
trial court of its own motion said, ''So there will be no misumlerstanding I am only going to allow one eounsel to address the jury on each side . . . I am not going to permit
. . . [Mr. Matthews] to argue, and then the defendant."
'l'his ruling was not literally a violation of section 1095, for
defendant was not represented by counsel; he had conducted
his own defense and l\ilr. lVIatthews had acted only as "legal
adviser," not counsel.
[29] Defendant contends that the ruling was prejudicial
error because he wished to argue the facts to the jury but he
wished Mr. Matthews, an attorney who could do so more effectively, to argue the law. It is for the court to decide questions of law and although it may permit counsel in argument
to state correct law, and to discuss the application of the law
to the facts, it may also refuse him permission to argue law.
(See Pen. Code, §§ 1124, 1126, 1127, 1093, par. 6; People v.
Den01nme (1899), 6 Cal.Unrep. 227, 231 [56 P. 98]; People
v. T'readwell (1886), 69 Cal. 226, 238 [10 P. 502]; People v.
Hcmey (1920), 46 Cal.App. 317, 324 [189 P. 338]; and cases
collected in 7 McKinney's New Cal.Dig., Criminal Law,
§§ 624, 625.)
[28b] Furthermore, even if we assume that lVIr. Matthews
might have argued certain aspects of the facts as related to
the law more skillfully than defendant, it appears that defendant by his insistence upon conducting his own case and refusing to appear by counsel has put himself in a position where
he cannot complain of the trial court's ruling. He made no
objection thereto in the trial court; also, as stated, he was not
represented by ''counsel'' at all. Unless a party authorizes
an attorney to represent him he is not entitled to have the
attorney speak for him. There was no error in refusing to
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permit the consulting but nonrepresenting attorney to argue
the case.
Argument of Prosecnding Attorney and Instructions to Jury
as to Mean1:ng of Life Irnprisonrnent Without Possibility
of ParoT/e
[30] 'l'he prosecuting attorney argued that "punishment
for life imprisonment without possibility of parole does not
mean what it says. Those are the words that are used in the
statute defining the punishment, but that is not what it
means,'' because of the possibility of pardon, commutation or
the Legislature's changing the penalty. Furthermore, he repeatedly commented that defendant "hasn't much to lose if
you just convict him of robbery. Robbery doesn't mean a
thing to him. No. To convict him of robbery is just like you
going home. Time means nothing to him.''
The jury were apparently impressed by this argument, for
after they had deliberated for a time they returned into court
and requested instruction as to the meaning of life imprisonment without possibility of parole. The trial court said, "that
primarily means that the person committed to prison under,
such a sentence will be required to serve life imprisonment
in prison, and can not be paroled," and explained that a person sente11ced to life imprisonment for murder, for example,
could be paroled. It went on to say further, however, as the
prosecuting attorney had in his argument, that there was always a possibility of commutation, pardon, or a legislative
change in punishment. 4 A juror asked whether, if the punishment of life imprisonment without possibility of parole were
imposed, "would there be any assurance that that party would
never be free again?'' and the court again pointed out the
possibility of action by the governor or the Legislature.
This insistence of the trial court in emphasizing such possibilitiAs operated to his prejudice, defendant says, and resulted
in the impmdtion of the death penalty. He relies upon such
<'ases as People v. Ramos (1935), 3 Cal.2d 269, 272 [44 P.2d
301], <md People v. LeTournea11 (]949), 34 Cal.2d 478, 494
[211 P.2d 8651, in support of his contention that the trial
court should not have discussed the matter with the jury and
s;hould not have permitted the prosecuting attorney to argue it.
'rhe statements of which defendant complains relate
solely to the question of punishment for the crime of kidnap4
As will appear infra, p. 191, the Legislature since the date of trial
of this ease, has made such a change in punishment.
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ing for the purpos~ of robbery where the victim suffers bodily
harm, a question which is addressed to the discretion of the
jury. (Pen. Code, § 209.) It is clear from the colloquy between the jurors and the judge, and from the verdicts subsequently arrived at, that it was this question which they were
considering when they returned to court for further instructions. They must already have tentatively determined that
the kidnaping victims had correctly identified defendant and
drawn the permissible inferences that the kidnapings were
within section 209 before they reached the question of the
meaning of imprisonment without possibility of parole. Thereafter they exercised their discretion with discrimination, for
they determined that the type of bodily harm inflicted upon
defendant's female victims deserved a more severe punishment
than the type of bodily harm inflicted on Waisler, victim of
the ordinary kidnaping-robbery which constituted crime (16).
"It is understandable that jurors, who are charged with the
duty of fixing the penalty in the event that they find a defendant guilty . . . , should be interested in knowing the nature
and effect of the penalties which they may impose; and neither
reason nor authority indicates that the trial court should be
prohibited from enlightening the jurors when questions are
asked upon that subject." (People v. Osborne (1951), 37 Cal.
2d 380, 384 [231 P .2d 850].) Upon the circumstances shown
here, there was no error in this respect.
The Holding of People v. Knowles (1950), supra, 35 Cal..2d
175, 179, that Detention Dttring Armed Robbery Is Kidnaping for the Purpose of Robbery as Defined by Section
209 of the Penal Code, and the 1951 Amendment of Section 209
Defendant asks that this court reexamine its holding in
People v. Knowles and overrule that case. His arguments are
those advanced in the dissenting opinions of the Knowles case,
and those rejected in People v. Tanner (1935), supra, 3 Cal.2d
279, 293-298. They were ably presented in those cases, we
considered them with care, and we view the question as resolved insofar as concerns the statute as it was cast prior to
the 1951 amendment.
As stated in the Knowles case (pp. 180, 183, of 35
Cal.2d) , if section 209 was regarded as too harsh, the remedy
was for the I.egislature to change it, not for this court to
ehange the plain language of the section by "interpretation."
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The Legislature has seen fit to make such a change. At the
time of the Knowles decision section 209 (as amended in 1933
to define detention for armed robbery as kidnaping) provided in material part that ''Every person who . . . holds
or detains . . . [another person] to commit . . . robbery . . .
shall suffer death or shall be punished by imprisonment in
the State prison for life without possibility of parole, at the
discretion of the jury trying the same, in cases in which the
person . . . subjected to such kidnaping suffers . . . bodily
harm . . . '' As amended in 1951 section 209 provides in material part, ''Any person . . . who· kidnaps or carries away
any individual to commit robbery . . . shall suffer death or
shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life
without possibility of parole, at the discretion of the jury trying the same, in cases in which the person . . . subjected to
such kidnaping suffers . . . bodily harm.
''Any person serving a sentence of imprisonment for life
without possibility of parole following a conviction under
this section as it read prior to the· eff~ctive date of this act
shall be eligible for a release on parole as if he had been sentenced to imprisonment for life with possibility of parole.''
[31a] The detention of the victim during the commission of
armed robbery, if committed since the 1951 amendment, is not
punishable under section 209. Furthermore, under that amendment, all persons (such as Knowles) held under sentences of
life imprisonment without possibility of parole for violations
of section 209 prior to the amendment, are now eligible for
parole. Defendant urges that the 1951 amendment also shows
a legislative intent that the crime of armed robbery, committed
after the 1933 amendment and prior to the later amendment,
should not be punishable under section 209; that this legislative intent applies retrospectively to offenses which were
committed before the 1951 amendment, but as to which judgment of conviction has not yet become final. If defendant were
sentenced to suffer the death penalty for conduct amounting to
no more than robbery with infliction of bodily harm, his argument would be relevant. (See Sekt v. Justice's Court (1945),
26 CaL2d 297, 305 [159 P.2d 17, 167 A.L.R. 833], citing cases
from other jurisdictions which hold that, where a statute mitigating punishment is enacted after commission of the offense
but before final judgment of conviction, "the offender who
commits an offense before the amendment of the statute imposing the lighter sentence gets the benefit of the lighter punish-
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ment, upon the ground that it must have been the intention
of the Legislature that the offender should be punished, and,
since he can be constitutionally punished under the new statute, that should be done"; cf. ln re Fisher (1934), 1 Cal.App.
2d 449 [36 P.2d 841]; 1n re Eyre (1934), 1 Cal.App.2d 451
[36 P.2d 842], which hold that an amendment reducing punishment was prospective in its operation and did not aid a
prisoner as to whom judgment of conviction became final
before the amendment.) But the offenses for which defendant
received the death penalty here were not mere armed robberies. Defendant by threat of force transported his female
victims-Mary for a considerable distance in defendant's car,
Regina from the car of Lea to the car of defendant-pursuant to a plan which purposed the commission of robberies and
the infliction of bodily harm (the sex crimes) . The fact that
Regina in being kidnaped or carried away was forced to
move only 22 feet does not make her abduction any the less
kidnaping within the meaning of the statute. She was taken
from the car of her chosen escort, and from his company, to
the car of defendant and into the latter's company and there
detained as a virtual prisoner and forced to submit to his demands. [32] It is the fact, not the distance, of forcible removal
which constitutes kidnaping in this state. (People v. Ra1tcho
(1935), 8 Cal.App.2d 655, 665 [47 P.2d 1108] [held, as alternate ground of decision, that forcing victims to cross street
and enter automobile constituted "kidnaping and carrying
away"]; People v. Cook (1937), 18 Cal.App.2d 625, 627 [64
P .2d 449] [dragging victim from sidewalk into adjacent house
constituted kidnaping]; People v. Melendrez (1938), 25 Cal.
App.2d 490, 494 [77 P.2d 870] [defendants forced victim to
walk 50 to 75 feet; held, they "committed an act of kidnaping"] ; People v. Sh1:elds (1945), 70 Cal.App.2d 628, 630 [161
P.2d 475] [evidence that defendant carried child from front
of house to roof supported conviction of kidnaping] ; People
v. Oganesoff (1947), 81 Cal.App.2d 709, 711 [184 P.2d 953]
[evidence that defendant forcibly carried victim from automobile in front of his house into the house supported conviction of kidnaping]; see Cox v. S"tate (1931), 203 Ind. 544, 550
[177 N.E. 898, 181 N.E. 469] [carrying child 90 feet was within
:statute which denounced forcibly carrying a person "from any
place within this state"]; State v. Taylor (1940), 70 N.D.
201,209 [293 N.W. 219] [victim compelled to drive defendant
in victim's car for a very short distance; "Where asportation
is charged, the distance removed is not material''].)

Dec.1951]

PEOPLE

v.

CHESSMAN

193

[38 C.2d 166; 238 P.2d 1001]

[31b] Because the conduct which resulted in the two death
sentences is conduct which remains punishable by death, at the
discretion of the jury, since the 1951 amendment of section
209, there is no occasion for reversal or modification of those
sentences because of that amendment.

Double Punishment and Double Jeopardy
[33-35] Defendant has not been put twice in jeopardy for
any offense. The doctrine of double jeopardy has no application
to a defendant who is tried but once on several counts. (People v. Amick (1942), 20 Cal.2d 247, 251 [125 P.2d 25] .)
Defendant is correct in his contention that punishing him
separately for the violations of section 209 of the Penal Code
(kidnaping) and for the robberies and sex crimes which, under
the circumstances here, are essential parts of those violations,
would amount to double punishment, which is forbidden by
section 654 of the Penal Code. (People v. Knowles (1950),
supra, 35 Cal.2d 175, 189; In re Shull (1944), 23 Cal.2d 745,
750 [146 P.2d 417] .) However, since defendant is subject to
two validly imposed death sentences, no purpose would be
served by reversal of other judgments of conviction. (People
v. Smith (1950), 36 Cal.2d 444, 448 [224 P.2d 719] .)
For the reasons above stated, the judgments and order
appealed from are affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
Because, as was pointed out in the dissenting opinions of
Mr. Justice Edmonds and myself in People v. Chessman, 35
Cal.2d 455, 468, 469 [218 P.2d 769, 19 A.L.R.2d 1084], there
is no adequate record upon which this court may review the
judgments of conviction against the defendant, I would reverse said judgments and order denying defendant a new trial
on that ground alone. A reading of the majority opinion,
however, convinces me that many flagrant errors were committed during the trial which would ordinarily be held to be
prejudicial and require the reversal of a judgment of conviction. In fact, the only way I can rationalize the majority
opinion is that those concurring therein feel that a person
charged with 17 felonies of the character of those charged
38 C.2d-7
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against the defendant, and who represents himself, is not
entitled to a trial in accordance with the rules applicable to
the ordinary criminal case. I cannot subscribe to this doctrine.
EDMONDS, J.-The judgments of conviction, including
two which carry a sentence of death, are affirmed upon record which, admittedly, is not a complete transcript of the proceedings before the trial court. As I pointed out in People v.
Chessman, 35 Cal.2d 455, 470 [218 P.2d 769, 19 A.L.R.2d
1084], the transcript omits certain pertinent testimony and
was made up in a manner which does not comply with the
Rules on Appeal. It was certified by the trial judge as a substitute for a correct record and was considered by him '' . . .
as the basis of establishing a transcript on appeal.''
Manifestly, this court could not make ''an examination of
the entire cause, including the evidence" as required by the
Constitution (Const., art. VI, § 4lj2 ) without "the entire record of the action" to which the appellant is entitled. (Rules
on Appeal, rule 33, subd. c.) Notwithstanding these provisions, in the absence of a showing by the appellant that he has
been prejudiced by omissions and inaccuracies in the record,
the approximate and inexact transcript is held to be a sufficient basis for reviewing the judgments of conviction. Such
procedure, in my opinion, has taken from Chessman a substantial right.
For these reasons, and without considering other points presented by the appellant, I would reverse the judgments of conviction and remand the cause for a new trial.

a

A petition for a stay of remittitur and appellant's petition
for a rehearing were denied January 15, 1952. Edmonds,
J., and Carter, J., were of the opinion that the petition for
a rehearing should be granted.

